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Study Overview
The analysis here focuses on patterns of welfare use and employment for welfare
leavers for central counties in each of the metropolitan reas of Atlanta, Baltimore, Fort
Lauderdale, Chicago, Houston and Kansas City.  We examine the extent to which
economic growth and welfare policy interact to induce observed patterns.
Following a review of the literature on the determinants of the welfare caseload and
employment of welfare leavers, we provide detail on the waiver provisions and related
welfare reform activities occurring in each of the sites and their espective states, as well
as information on how implementation of the 1996 federal reform legislation i fluenced
state programs.  In each of our sites, major welfare reform at the local or state level
began well in advance of the implementation of the 1996 federal reform as the states
received federal waivers permitting substantial deviations from AFDC rules.  Among
waiver provisions were the strengthening of work requirements--in some cases applied
with special force to long-term recipients--restrictions on the length of time payments
could be received, and requirements that recipients enter into agreements to achieve self-
sufficiency.  Under some reforms, recipients were provided with new services to aid
them in obtaining employment, and those leaving the welfare rolls were eligible to retain
certain benefits that would have been lost under earlier ules, such as medical care and
child care assistance.  Major changes in the administrative structures occurred as well.
We begin our quantitative analysis showing how unemployment rates and welfare
caseloads varied across our sites over the period of our study.  After an economic
slowdown in the early 1990s, economic growth was brisk in each of our sites.  Similarly,
after a period of growth in most sites, caseloads declined substantially.  Rates of decline
have further accelerated since implementation of TANF.  There are, however,
substantial differences across site .  From their peaks, overall declines varied from 44
percent for Kansas City to 88 percent for FortLauderdale.  The patterns of decline
suggest that administrative differences played a critical role, since sites with the greatest
declines in welfare are not necessarily those with the strongest economies.
We then examine what role changes in flows of entry into welfare and exit from
welfare played in caseload eclines.  In all sites, we observe increases in the rate of exit
for recipients and declines in the number of people entering welfare.  We also look
separately at exit rates for those who had received welfare for at least two consecutive
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years.  In all sites, such long-term recipients were less likely to leave welfare than others,
but the increases over the 1990s in rates of exit were proportionally greater.  While it has
been suggested that caseload eclines would produce an increasing concentration of
long-term recipients among those remaining, the proportion of recipients who have
received welfare for more than two years has generally declined in our sites, with the
decline particularly notable in the period 1998-1999.
If the emphasis placed on moving welfare recipients into employment was reflected
in actual reform implementation, we would expect that increasing numbers of welfare
leavers would obtain employment in recent years as caseloads declined.  We therefore
examine the proportion of those leaving welfare who were employed in the quarter
immediately after their last welfare payment.  While there are some differences across
sites, we find that employment rates of welfare leavers have grown in all the sites.
Given the strong economy over this period, we cannot assure that his increase is a result
of state policies, but the trend does suggest that employment is at least associated with
the caseload decline.  On the other hand, in Atlanta, it appears that policy changes
instituted with TANF may have substantially reduced employment of welfare leavers.
In both Atlanta and Fort Lauderdale, among those who had jobs after leaving welfare,
it appears that a substantial proportion experienced a period of nonemployment after
exiting welfare.
It is clear that, at most sites, the decline in caseloads occurred at the same time that
welfare-to-work transitions occurred in increasing numbers.  On the other hand, the
drastic declines in Fort Lauderdale over the 1990s, as well as policy shifts occurring in
Atlanta following federal welfare reform, may have led to an increase in the number of
former welfare recipients facing employment difficulties.
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Introduction
  
The last decade has seen extraordinary changes in the programs supporting indigent
parents and their children in the U.S., popularly known as welfare.  From its inception
in the 1930s through the 1960s, federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) operated on the implicit assumption that a mother's primary job should be
caring for her children.  With greater labor force participation by women and increased
acceptance of working mothers, public opinion has gradually shifted away from this
view in recent decades, with an increased emphasis on work as an alternative to welfare.
Although the Work INcentive Program (WIN), incorporated into AFDC beginning
in 1967, attempted to give recipients access to state job service support, its
implementation provided few concrete benefits and little incentive for recipients to
participate in the labor market.  A major step toward increasing labor market
involvement of recipients was marked by passage of the Family Support Act of 1988,
which required states to develop job training programs that would serve a substantial
proportion of AFDC recipients with a broad array of services.  Funding was quite
limited, however, and the economy entered a recession shortly after its implementation.
 Changes to an employment-focused ystem culminated with passage of the federal
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996, which
replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  The new
legislation specified explicit work requirements for participants as well as limitations
on the length of time aid could be received.  Equally important, the legislation no longer
treated aid as an entitlement for families meeting certain eligibility requirements but
instead allowed states to provide aid in accord with a wide variety of program structures.
These legislative benchmarks provide only a rough indication of the changes
occurring in the effective administration f aid programs, however.  In the 1990s, under
federal waivers, many states developed programs that modified the basic structure of
AFDC, imposing increasingly stringent work and training requirements on aid
recipients.  In addition, legislation as well as policy and administrative directives in
many states have shifted program emphasis away from provision of aid to families and
toward finding employment alternatives to public assistance.  Bureaucratic change has
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incentives, and the possibility that concern for migration of potential recipients would shape state
policies.
2Families  receiving  AFDC or  TANF,  computed as the  average  monthly  level  (Department of
Health and Human Services, 2001).
3See Mayer (2000)  for a review  of the  literature  that  examines the  determinants of the welfare
caseload.  Studies of particular interest focusing on the period prior to the 1990s include Peskin (1993)
and Black et al. (1999).
4
accelerated as states develop rograms under the 1996 federal reform (Nathan and Gais,
1999).1
National patterns of aid receipt suggest that unprecedented changeshave occurred
since the early 1990s.  After moderate increases through most of the previous two
decades, for the most part tracing the growth of the U.S. population, the number of
families receiving aid under AFDC/TANF had reached 4.0 million by 1990.  In the next
four years, the caseload reached a peak of 5.0 million and then began a decline, falling
to 3.9 million in 1997 and 2.6 million in 1999, a level not seen since 1970.2
An extended literature uses data across tates and over time to examine the relative
importance of economic growth and policy in explaining the welfare caseload.3 
Particular attention has been focusing on the 1990s.  Caseload changes through 1996
have been difficult o explain, and there has been some controversy as to the importance
of economic and administrative changes (Blank, 1997; Council of Economic Advisors,
1997; Martini and Wiseman, 1997; Figlio and Ziliak, 1999; Moffitt, 1999; Wallace and
Blank, 1999; Bartik and Eberts, 1999; Mueser et al., 2000; Ribar, 2000; Ziliak et al.,
2000).  However, it seems clear that the implementation of federal welfare reform,
passed by Congress in 1996, has had a larger impact on caseloads (Council of
Economics Advisors, 1999). 
There have been only ver  limited analyses that focus on the dynamics underlying
the caseload, considering separately factors influencing flows onto and off of welfare
(Blank and Ruggles, 1994; Gittleman, 2000; Klerman and Haider, 2000).  Attempts to
identify the impacts of different kinds of policies have met with some success (Hofferth
et al., 2000; but see Gittleman, 2000).  Recipients appear to respond in predictable ways
to time limits (Moffitt and Pavetti,2000; Grogger, 2000, 2001).  Studies also show that
welfare-related policy changes have been associated with increases in labor force
participation (Bishop, 1998; Moffitt, 1999) as well as increases in earnings, declines in
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poverty and increase in marriage rates among those most likely to be eligible for welfare
(Schoeni and Blank, 2000).
While data from the 1970s and 1980s uggested that employment was of relatively
little importance in explaining why individuals eft the welfare rolls (Bane and Ellwood,
1983; O'Neill et al., 1987), recent work suggests hat it plays an important role.  In part,
this reflects the fact that recent studies have used a shorter time frame to measure
welfare xits (employment may play a greater role in predicting temporary exits), nd
also possibly to changes over time in the role of employment (Blank, 1989; Harris, 1993;
Hoynes, 1996).  It remains an open question, however, how successful welfare reforms
will be in assuring that former welfare recipients move into employment and self-
sufficiency.  As caseloads decline, it is clear that many of those leaving welfare include
long-term recipients and others with substantial barriers to obtaining employment (Kalil
et al., 1998), and that wages in the jobs available to them will be low (Lawson and King,
1997).  
There are a number of recent attempts o determine the employment experiences of
those leaving welfare in the 1990s (Brauner and Loprest, 1999; Loprest, 1999; Parrott,
1998; Cancian et al., 1999; Tweedie t al., 1999; Ribar, 2000).  It is clear that a large
share of welfare leavers is employed.  While their average wages are low, their labor
market experiences are highly heterogeneous.  Some appear to be appreciably better off
than they were while receiving welfare, while others are appreciably worse off.  The
most important shortcoming of these studies is that they do not provide comparisons
before and after welfare reform of the experiences of those leaving welfare, so that it is
not possible to infer the impact of policy changes or the economy on those xperiences.
Given the substantial turnover in welfare receipt, those l aving welfare will tend to be
individuals with the most attractive outside opportunities.  Examining how families’
circumstances after leaving welfare compared with their own prior welfare xperience
tells us little about the impact of welfare policies.  It is necessary to examine how the
experiences of those leaving welfare under different policy regimes compare.
Loprest (2000) provides the best study of the impact of policy on welfare leavers’
employment, comparing a cohort of welfare leavers prior to implementation f TANF
(1995-1997) with a cohort leaving since implementation (1997-1999).  These results
suggest that hose xiting since TANF implementation have slightly better employment
experiences than prior recipients.  However, because the sample is national, there is little
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way to determine how state differences affected results, and the time period precludes
a comparison of TANF reforms with those occurring under waivers in the early and mid-
1990s.
The current study examines the dynamic structure of AFDC/TANF participation and
the labor market involvement of participants starting in the early 1990s through 1997 in
the core counties containing Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Fort Lauderdale, Houston, and
Kansas City.4  All these cities displayed a r cent decline in welfare caseloads, broadly
consistent with the national trend.  The first objective of this analysis is to ident fy the
flows onto and off of welfare that have produced these changes.  Our analysis also
considers how long-term aid recipients have fared in this recent period and whether they
are subject to high rates of exit from the rolls.  
We also examine the employment experiences of welfare recipients during this
period.  One might expect that the increasing concern with employment of welfare
recipients would have been associated with higher employment levels.  On the other
hand, many administrative changes may have had the effect of discouraging individuals
from continuing to receive public assistance even when their employment opportunities
were very limited.  Our analysis will allow us to examine whether observed increases
in the exit rates from welfare are associated with declines or increases in employment
of those leaving.
By focusing on six major cities, we can examine the extent to which differences in
state and local policy and administrative directives and local labor market conditions
contribute o observed trends.  It is widely acknowledged that policy and administrative
changes designed to move families from the rolls have been facilitated by a growing
economy.  Comparison across cities will allow us to begin to understand mechanisms
inducing change and the interaction between labor market conditions and government
action.
Our work follows that of King and Schexnayder (1988), King et al. (1991), Lane and
Stevens (1995, Forthcoming) and Lane et al. (1997), who have used administrative data
on employment and AFDC participation in Texas and Maryland to examine the
dynamics of welfare and work.  The research reported here is unique in that it focuses
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on how dynamics have shifted over this recent period of extraordinary policy and
program change in six large geographically distinct metropolitan areas.
We next describe our data sources and the details of our approach.  We then turn to
a discussion of the policy context, specifying state and local policy and program changes
occurring in the 1990s over the period of our study.  The following section describes our
results and the final section summarizes and spells out implications.
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Data Sources and Approach
Our data pertain to AFDC/TANF cases in a central county in six metropolitan reas:
Fulton County, GA (Atlanta); Baltimore City, MD;5 Cook County, IL (Chicago);
Broward County, FL (Fort Lauderdale); Harris County, TX (Houston); and Jackson
County, MO (Kansas City).  In each case, the county contains all or almost all of the
central city population.  With the exception of Baltimore, the county also contains
substantial population outside the central city, although a large share of the county's
welfare recipients reside in the central city. The proportion of the metropolitan
population included in the central county varies from less than one-fifth (for Fulton
County in the Atlanta Metropolitan Area) to nearly three-quarters (for Harris County in
the Houston Metropolitan area).  Although we will follow the convention of referencing
each site by the name of its central city, all information on welfare participation applies
to the central county, unless explicitly noted otherwise.
We have limited our focus to families headed by females aged 18 but less than 65
who received AFDC-Basic or TANF cash payments.6   The unit of analysis can be
viewed as the family or as the case head, who is the mother or female payee.  We omit
those who received only noncash benefits even if they were listed as AFDC or TANF
recipients.  We have aggregated monthly benefit payments to quarterly totals, so that
anyone who received payments in any month in a quarter is counted as receiving
payments in that quarter.  This allows greater comparability with quarterly earnings data
and smooths over some of the administrative churning in the welfare data.
Because  administrative practices regarding the archiving of data differ across states,
the period of coverage for our sites varies somewhat.  Data for Baltimore and Kansas
City are available beginning in 1990, Atlanta nd Houston in 1992, Fort Lauderdale in
1993, and Chicago in 1995.  In all sites, welfare data extend through 1999.
In order to examine the employment experiences of welfare recipients, we obtained
quarterly total earnings for all individuals in jobs covered by unemployment i surance
(UI) in the state, matching these to the records of AFDC/TANF recipients.  For the
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analysis of Kansas City, both Missouri and Kansas earnings data were used.  The vast
majority of employment in each state is covered by these data, although illegal
employment, self-employment, and several classes of nonprofit and federal employment
are not covered.  The files also fail to identify employment for individuals who left the
state.  Out-of-state employment for residents i  not significant, except in Kansas City,
where Jackson County residents often have jobs across the border in Kansas.
Finally, as an indicator of the general economic climate in the region, we have
quarterly information on unemployment for the primary metropolitan area.  Our decision
to use the metropolitan area rather than the county stems from our concern that our
measure of the local economy not be influenced by welfare policy.  Whereas
unemployment for a single county might be influenced by an influx of former welfare
recipients as well as intrametropolitan mobility and resulting local demographic
changes, such effects will be much smaller at the level of the metropolitan area.
As noted above, our measure of welfare receipt is measured quarterly, so that hose
receiving any cash payment for any month in the quarter are viewed as recipients.  Given
monthly turnover, the caseload measured this way for a given quarter will be slightly
greater than the highest monthly caseload.  In examining movements onto and off of
welfare, we define an individual as leaving welfare in a given quarter if she received
welfare during that quarter but not during the following quarter.  Similarly, an individual
is defined as entering welfare if she was not receiving welfare in that quarter but was
receiving welfare in the following quarter.  This structure implies that caseload can be
identified as changing according to the equation of motion:
Caseload(T+1) = Caseload(T) - Exits(T) + Entries(T)
where Exits(T) and Entries(T) are defined by comparison between quarter T and quarter
T+1.  The rate of exit is calculated as Exits(T)/Caseload(T), so that it indicates the
chance that an individual receiving welfare in quarter T receives no welfare in the
following quarter.  In order to examine exit rates for long-term recipients, we defined
the exit rate analogously for all individuals who had received welfare payments
continuously for two years. 
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To consider the extent of welfare recidivism, we looked at trends in the numbers of
those entering welfare (i.e., who received welfare in a given quarter but not the prior
quarter), but who had also received welfare payments at any point in the prior eight
quarters.  Our determination of prior welfare experience is limited to the same county,
since we did not identify those who had received welfare elsewhere.
Our measure of the rate of employment for welfare leavers is the proportion
receiving earnings in quarter T+1 among those who received welfare payments in
quarter T but not in quarter T+1.  As indicated above, our measure of earnings is limited
to employment within the state (or two adjoining states in the case of Kansas City) that
is reported to the state unemployment insurance system.  This measure includes both
individuals who obtained jobs prior to or immediately after leaving welfare as well as
some individuals who left welfare but found a job only after an extended period of
unemployment.  While this measure indicates the extent to which welfare leavers obtain
jobs, the latter group does not appear to be drawn from welfare by employment
opportunities.  To examine this issue, we obtain a count of those receiving welfare in
quarter T but not T+1 who were employed in T+1 but not T.  Such individuals are
almost sure to experience a “support gap” between ending welfare receipt and receiving
their first earnings.  The measures we used to identify welfare dynamics are summarized
in Table 1.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF MEASURES OF WELFARE DYNAMICS
Caseload at quarter T is defined as the total number of families (or case heads)
receiving AFDC/TANF payments and fitting our selection criteria, at any point
during the quarter.
Exits for quarter T is defined as the number of individuals who received payments
in quarter T but not in T+1.
Entries for quarter T is defined as the number of individuals who received welfare
payments in quarter T+1 but not in T.
Exit rate is the number of exits at quarter T divided by the caseload in quarter T.
Exit rate for long-term recipients is defined as above but applies to individuals
who had been receiving welfare payments for at least two years continuously.
Employment rates of Welfare Leavers is the number of individuals leaving
welfare in quarter T and receiving earnings during quarter T+1 divided by the
number of individuals leaving welfare at T.
Welfare exit rates for employed recipients is the number of individuals leaving
welfare in quarter T and receiving earnings in quarter T+1 divided by the number
receiving welfare in quarter T and receiving earnings in quarter T+1.
Proportion with support gap is the proportion not employed in T among those
employed in T+1 and who exited welfare in T.
              Urban Welfare-to-Work Transitions in the 
                                                                      1990s:  Patterns in Six Urban Areas
12
The Policy Context
Between the late 1980s and 1999, the U.S. welfare system was transformed from a
unified structure, allocating cash and in-kind payments according to specified rules, to
a set of state programs designed to focus on providing aid in obtaining employment and
transitional financial support.  Although the WIN program, in effect in various forms
since 1967, required states to set up programs designed to aid welfare recipients in
obtaining employment, in practice, funding was very limited and only a small number
of recipients received even low-intensity services.  Despite some differences across
states, including very large differences in grant levels, federal AFDC rules led states to
emphasize complex eligibility requirements, often creating bureaucratic obstacles to
recipients who wished to obtain employment (Bane and Ellwood, 1994, chapter 1).
Passage of the federal Family Support Act of 1988 established the JOBS program,
which for the first time required that states provide employment-related services to a
substantial share of welfare recipients.  However, major program changes did not occur
until the 1990s, when many states were granted federal waivers that allowed them to
operate programs under modified AFDC rules.  Passage of the federal Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996 provided a complete
overhaul of welfare, signaled clearly by the elimination of AFDC and its replacement
with a new program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  In large part,
this legislation completed the process of transferring to the states the power to design
their own welfare systems, abolishing the AFDC entitlement and replacing federal-state
cost sharing with federal block grants.  The new system did, however, carry with it a
number of important restrictions, including work requirements for recipients and lifetime
limitations on welfare receipt.
In addition to policy changes that focus explicitly on welfare, general changes in the
social climate, perhaps associated with a major change in the Congressional leadership
in Washington, occurred in the 1990s.  The most clearly relevant policy change was the
dramatic expansion i  the Earned Income Tax Credit during the 1990s, which increased
incentives for low paid individuals to participate in the labor force.  Recent studies
suggest that a portion of the decline in the welfare caseload was due to this as well as
to expansions of the Medicaid program (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 1999a, 1999b; Ellwood,
1999; Grogger, 2001).
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Table 2 provides a chronology for each of our sites, identifying statutory policy or
administrative changes in our sites’ welfare programs from 1991 through 1997.  Listed
changes reflect statewide programs as well as local policies, programs, or administrative
actions that may have affected welfare receipt in each of the sites.  For several of our
sites, changes in the rules prior to 1991 may have influenced the tone of the system, and
these are listed in the table as well.  By the end of 1997, the TANF program was in effect
in all our sites; we discuss changes in policy associated with the implementation of
TANF separately below.
It is clear that here are substantial differences in the timing of changes across ites.
There were no important changes in the program in Baltimore until October 1995, when
state welfare reform occurred.  In contrast, Atlanta had been affected by state welfare
reforms in 1986 and again in 1993.  The welfare program in Fort Lauderdale underwent
major changes in 1991 and 1992, including both the initiation of a new program and the
movement ofthe program from one state agency to another, which probably disrupted
services.  In Houston, a variety of administrative and related changes occurred
throughout the 1990s, although the most important changes probably occurred in March
of 1996, just eight months before TANF was implemented.
Although it provides ome indication as to the extent of program changes, the
identification f particular milestones may be somewhat misleading in those cases where
changes were largely continuous.  For example, although the federal JOBS program was
initiated in Kansas City in 1991, it initially served only a small number of clients,
expanding dramatically over the next two years.  Similarly, the Twenty-First Century
Program, initiated in Kansas City in 1994 with a federal waiver, would have had its
primary impact as it expanded over the next two years.
Although state policy changes prior to the 1996 federal welfare reform were of
substantial importance, in most of our sites, implementation f the TANF program was
associated with major additional program changes.  Most states passed new legislation
to implement TANF reforms, often further strengthening work requirements or imposing
more stringent time limits. An exception among our sites is Kansas City.  In contrast to
most states, Missouri enacted no major legislation to facilitate implementation of the
1996 federal welfare reform, so program changes necessary to make Missouri's welfare
program consistent with the federal law were made at the administrative level, and these
are less significant than those at our other sites.
TABLE 2.  LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING  WELFARE PROGRAMS AT STUDY SITES
Prior to 1991 1991 1992 1993
Atlanta 1986: Positive Employment
And Community Help Plan,
providing education,
transportation, child care.
November: Statewide waiver
granted for child support
enforcement.
November: Personal Accountability
and Responsibility Project waiver
granted, strengthening work
requirements, setting family cap,
allowing more earnings and
Medicaid benefits to be retained for
those working.
Baltimore June: Statewide waiver granted
for child support enforcement.
Chicago 1986: Employment initiative
implemented under WIN.
1989: Self-Sufficiency
Demonstration waiver.
1990: JOBS implemented
November: Work Pays program
implemented, increasing earnings
disregard, related reforms.
Fort Lauderdale1986: Project Independence
replaces welfare system.
January: Hiring freeze at
Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services
disrupts program. 
October: Changes in job
readiness criteria.  Caseload
reduction measures initiated.
July: Florida Department of
Labor and Employment
Security assumes responsibility
for Project Independence, with
transition adversely affecting
program services.
Houston 1990: Job Opportunities in
the Business Sector initiative
begins.  Transitional child
care and Medicaid benefits
begin.  Federal JOBS
program implemented.
April: Child Care
Management System offers
improved access to child care.
Kansas City July: Federal JOBS program implemented.
1994 1995
Atlanta July: Inception of WORKFIRST, focused on income assistance for employment
and job diversion.
October: Second waiver approved, providing income disregards and allowing
vehicle ownership for commuting.  New work requirements applied to those
receiving welfare in 24 of previous 36 months.
Baltimore October: Family Investment Program implemented, with up-front job search
requirements and child support provisions.
Chicago October: JOBS work exemptions and sanctions become more stringent.
Fort Lauderdale
Houston July: Statewide waiver granted for child support enforcement.
September: JOBS and Food Stamps transferred from Department of Human
Services to newly created Texas Workforce Commission.
October: JOBS programs shifts to work-first orientation.
Kansas City June: 21st Century Program initiated (federal waiver),
focusing efforts on employment for welfare recipients.
October: Missouri welfare reform bill (HB 1547)
formally takes effect, requiring JOBS participation and
signing of self-sufficiency pacts for most welfare
recipients, allowing increased asset ownership,
increasing efforts to determine paternity, requiring
minor parents to live with parents, and providing for
wage supplementation.  Initially there is little effective
enforcement of these provisions.
Wage supplementation and job placement program develop as unified system
throughout the year.
April: Statewide waiver granted specifying work requirements, increasing work
incentives, and facilitating child support enforcement.
June: First participants enrolled in self-sufficiency pacts.
1996 1997
Atlanta August: Work requirement strengthened (exemption
requires child age one or less rather than three or less).
January: TANF implemented.
March: State welfare reform passed with four-year cash assistance maximum,
family cap, work requirements.
July-August: Georgia Work connection, collaboration between DHR, U.S. Dept.
of Labor and state training agencies signals expansion of welfare-to-work efforts.
August: TANF recipients dropped if they failed to sign personal responsibility
agreement.
Baltimore August: Statewide waiver granted specifying work
requirements, increasing work incentives.
October: Welfare avoidance grants and child care only
provisions implemented to aid working parents.
December: TANF implemented
Chicago February: New time limit (24 months) becomes
effective but only applies to those with oldest child at
least age 13.
July: TANF implemented.
Fort
Lauderdale
June: Statewide waiver granted for child support
enforcement.
October: TANF implemented.  Work and Gain
Economic Self-Sufficiency (WAGES) becomes
effective statewide specifying restrictive work activity
requirements, two-year aid limit in any five-year
period, and four-year lifetime limit.
October: Local workforce coalition established in Broward County.
Houston March: Statewide waiver granted specifying work
requirements, time limits, increasing work incentives.
April: Child care programs transferred from DHS to
TWC.
November: TANF implemented.
December: State time limit implemented.
November: Texas Works diverts applicants to work and community services.
December: Welfare applicants must attend workforce orientation.
Kansas City November: New rules require that JOBS clients called
to participate must respond within five days or face
sanctions.
December: TANF implemented.
F bruary: Post-employment case management developed.
July: Case worker specialization instituted. 
October: Further training to shift case worker emphasis to employment.
December: Work-first approach adopted in JOBS.
Source:  Based on state and local administrative directives and interviews with government officials.
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7In the year prior to TANF  implementation,  Illinois  imposed  restrictive  time  limits,  but these
applied only to cases where the youngest child was at least age 13. 
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In order to indicate the extent of changes associated with TANF implementation,
Table 3 compares ten categories of regulations in effect in July 1996, prior to TANF
implementation in our sites, to those in July 1997, subsequent to implementation.
Where substantial changes occurred, these are highlighted in the table. 
Column 1 shows that differences between the sites in payment levels that existed
under AFDC were not substantially altered by TANF implementation.  For a mother
with two dependent children, the maximum benefit levels in 1999 for families with no
other esources were as follows: Atlanta, $280; Baltimore, $399; Chicago, $377; Fort
Lauderdale, $303; Houston, $188; and Kansas City, $292.  Except in Baltimore, where
a 10 percent increase in benefits occurred between 1996 and 1999, these levels have
remained essentially unchanged in nominal terms ince 1990.  In real terms, maximum
benefit levels have dropped in all sites.  Columns 2 and 3 show that the initial eligibility
thresholds and the earned income disregard change in only two of the sites, Baltimore
and Fort Lauderdale, whereas in Chicago changes from AFDC rules had occurred under
waivers.  Notably, in three of the sites, the rules remained as they had under AFDC.
All sites experienced changes in time limits with the implementation of TANF
(column 4).  TANF imposed a five-year lifetime limit on welfare receipt, and none of
the sites previously had this kind of limitation.  In Florida, substantially more restrictive
time limits were imposed than at other sites, while in Texas, additional restrictions were
imposed in the year following TANF implementation.7
All sites how substantial changes in the child age exemption from work or training
requirements (column 5).  In all states, prior to TANF implementation, a mother with
a child under age 3 was not required to participate in work or training programs.  In
three of our sites, this figure declined to 12 months, and in Fort Lauderdale to 3 months.
In Missouri, there was no decline with TANF implementation, although the age did
decline in the following year; in Texas the age actually increased.
TABLE 3.  CHANGES IN WELFARE RULES ASSOCIATED WITH TANF  IMPLEMENTATION AT STUDY SITES
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Atlanta Pre-TANF $280 $514 AFDC 1 none 36 adult share, 6 mo. $1000 $1500 no yes
1997 same same same 60 12 total grant, perm. same $4650 no yes
Baltimore Pre-TANF $373 $607 AFDC 1 none 36 adult share, 6 mo. $1000 $1500 no yes
1997 $377 $471 26% 60 12 total grant, indef. $2000 1 vehicle yes yes
Chicago Pre-TANF $377 $467 66.7% none 5 36 adult share, 6 mo. $1000 $1500 no yes
1997 same same 66.7% 60 5 12 total grant, 3 mo. $3000 1 vehicle no yes
Fort
Lauderdale
Pre-TANF $303 $574 AFDC 1 none 36 adult share, 6 mo. $1000 $1500 no no
1997 same $806/
$393*
$200 +
50%
24/48 6 3 total grant, 3 mo. $1000/
$2000
$1500/
$8500*
yes yes
Houston Pre-TANF $188 $400 AFDC 1 none 36 adult share, 6 mo $1000 $1500 no no
1997 same same same 60 7 60/48* same $3000 $4650 no no
Kansas
City
Pre-TANF $292 $558 AFDC 1 none 36 adult share, 6 mo $5000 1 vehicle no no
1997 same same same 60 36/12* same same same no no
Table 3 Notes.
*The rule was different in 1997 and 1998; both rules are shown.
1AFDC rules are $120 and 33.3% of remainder for first 4 months, $120 next 8 months, $90 thereafter.
2All pre-TANF values are equity in vehicle.  Values for Atlanta and Houston in 1997 are fair market value; the values for Fort
Lauderdale are equity values.  The 1997 value for Atlanta requires that the vehicle be used for work or transportation to work or
school; otherwise the value is $1500.
3Diversion payments provide funds in lieu of welfare to help families facing short term crises.
4The Family Cap limits incremental payments for those who have additional children while they are receiving welfare payments.
5In February of 1996, Illinois instituted restrictive time limits (24 months) that applied only to those with children 13 or over.  By
1998, families with earned income and 20 hours per week of work faced no time limits.
6Florida imposes a 24-month time limit in any five year period and a 48-month lifetime limit.
7Texas imposed more stringent time limits in September 1997 (12, 24 or 36 months, depending on recipient circumstances).
Sources: Rowe (2000); time limit information also from Crouse (1999)
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8The 66.7 percent  disregard in Illinois is less generous  than the  Florida  structure  for almost all
recipients, since eligibility requires relatively low levels of earnings.
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The other listed categories differ across ites, with changes generally implying more
severe penalties for undesired behaviors (sanctions increase, a family cap is imposed)
but also greater reward for work by allowingrecip ents to keep more of their earnings
and to maintain higher asset levels.  Florida’s TANF implementation is associated with
the most changes, and it appears that it imposes the most severe restrictions on
recipients.  However, it does allow recipients to retain a larger share of their earnings
than do other sites (the first $200 of earnings and 50 percent of the remainder is
disregarded8), and it uses diversion payments o discourage new recipients.  Maryland,
which also had substantial program changes with TANF implementation, generally
applies less restrictive rules, although recipients do not have the same level of benefit
disregard.  As might be expected, given Missouri’s legislative inaction, the
implementation f TANF in Missouri had smaller effects on the program than in the
other sites.  With the exception of time limits and child age limits for work exemptions,
Missouri’s rules changed little with TANF.
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9Note that here and in other figures  combining  counts from different sites,  the scale for Atlanta,
Kansas City, and Fort Lauderdale differs from that for Baltimore, Chicago, and Houston.  In contrast,
those figures that present rates use a common scale for all sites.
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Results
A.  Labor Markets
Unemployment rates for all six areas are presented in Figure 1.  Since our concern
is with general economic conditions in the relevant labor market, hese figures pertain
to the primary metropolitan rea, not just the central county that is our focus.  In all six
areas, the data suggest very healthy economic growth since the early to mid-1990s.
Atlanta and Kansas City appear to have the tightest labor markets through most of the
1990s, both with unemployment ra es dipping below 4 percent in the period 1997-1999.
Unemployment ra es in Chicago averaged about a half a percent higher than these, while
the remaining sites were about a point higher.  In Baltimore, until 1997, the recovery
was not as pronounced as in the other sites, but in the last two years of our data,
unemployment ra es there have declined substantially, reaching 3.5 percent.  In contrast
to Baltimore, most sites experienced modest further declines in unemployment, or steady
unemployment, in the 1997-1999 period.  The exception was Houston, where
unemployment i creased by more than one percentage point in the last year of our data.
In short, while all areas have enjoyed economic growth, there are substantial inter-area
differences that could influence the experiences of AFDC/TANF recipients.  
B.  Trends in Caseload
Figure 2 graphs the welfare caseload over the 1990s for each area.9  For four of our
sites, the caseload increases from its level at the start of our period to a peak in the early
to mid-1990s, followed by a decline to the current level.  For Houston, we identify two
local peaks, one at the beginning of our data series, in the second quarter of 1992, and
a second only slightly lower one in the first quarter of 1994, followed by a decline to the
present level.  Although we do not have comparable data for prior periods, trends in the
state suggest that these peaks are close to the maximum caseload.  In Chicago, the
maximum caseload in our data occurs in the first quarter for which we have data, the 
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10See Lee et al. (2000).   If the trend for  Chicago’s caseload  corresponds  to that for  Illinois,  the
data they present suggest that the actual peak may be about 10 percent above our starting caseload
figure and that it occurred at some point in 1994.
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third quarter of 1995.  Data for the state of Illinois suggests that this level may be
substantially below the peak caseload.10
Table 4 provides caseload size at specified points in time, underscoring the
differences between sites. Fort Lauderdale’s caseload isplays the greatest reduction,
declining 59 percent from the peak to 1997, and 71 percent from 1997 to 1999.  The
declines for Houston are only slightly smaller.  Declines for Atlanta, Baltimore, and
Kansas City are smaller but still substantial.  It appears likely that Chicago would appear
similar to these three if we had data for the period of the early 1990s.
C.  Welfare Entry and Exit Rates
Figure 3 graphs the number entering welfare while Figure 4 graphs the number of
exits. The difference between them for any one site is the change in the size of the
caseload.
The trend in the number of entries is clearly declining at all sites.  The decline is
smallest for Atlanta and Baltimore, which show 22 and 25 percent decreases in the
number of entries, respectively, over the period for which we have data.  The decline is
30 percent for Kansas City, but it is more than 50 percent for Chicago and Houston and
is 78 percent for Fort Lauderdale.
There is no monotonic trend in the number of exits from welfare, as indicated by
Figure 4, since several sites have increases and then declines in exits.  Of course, the
number of exits is the product of the caseload and theexit rate, so that increases in the
exit rate--the behaviorally interesting measure--are hidden by the large caseload
declines.  Figure 5 graphs the exit rate over the period, which indicates the proportion
of recipients exiting welfare each quarter.  The time trend is strongly positive for each
site, although substantial differences exist among the sites.
The lowest exit rates appear to be in Atlanta, Baltimore, and Chicago.  Up through
1994, Atlanta and Baltimore had exit rates that averaged around 7 percent, increasing
gradually  and  matching  Chicago with average rates around 8 to 9 percent  through the
TABLE 4.  WELFARE CASELOAD TRENDS IN SIX AREAS
Initial Maximum Fourth Quarter 1997Fourth Quarter 1999
Area Quarter Caseload Quarter Caseload
Change
from
Initial Caseload
Change
from
Maximum Caseload
Change
from 1997
Atlanta 92:1 20,462 94:3 22,032 7.7% 14,474 -34.3% 9,188 -36.5%
Baltimore 90:1 32,753 92:3 37,291 13.9% 25,186 -32.5% 14,859 -41.0%
Fort
Lauderdale 93:1 21,461 93:4 22,853 6.5% 9,408 -58.8% 2,716 -71.1%
Chicago 95:3 132,345 95:3 132,345 0.0% 106,548 -19.5% 63,283 -40.6%
Houston 92:4 55,329 92:4 55,329 0.0% 24,397 -55.9% 12,244 -49.8%
Kansas City 90:3 10,890 94:3 14,560 33.7% 10,847 -25.5% 8,140 -25.0%
01000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
9
0
:1
9
0
:3
9
1
:1
9
1
:3
9
2
:1
9
2
:3
9
3
:1
9
3
:3
9
4
:1
9
4
:3
9
5
:1
9
5
:3
9
6
:1
9
6
:3
9
7
:1
9
7
:3
9
8
:1
9
8
:3
9
9
:1
9
9
:3
Quarters
A
tl
a
n
ta
, 
Fo
rt
 L
a
u
d
e
rd
a
le
, 
K
a
n
sa
s 
C
it
y
-10000
-5000
0
5000
10000
B
a
lt
im
o
re
, 
H
o
u
st
o
n
, 
C
h
ic
a
g
o
Atlanta Fort Lauderdale Kansas City Baltimore Houston Chicago
FIGURE 3.  NUMBER ENTERING WELFARE
500
1500
2500
3500
4500
5500
6500
7500
8500
9
0
:1
9
0
:3
9
1
:1
9
1
:3
9
2
:1
9
2
:3
9
3
:1
9
3
:3
9
4
:1
9
4
:3
9
5
:1
9
5
:3
9
6
:1
9
6
:3
9
7
:1
9
7
:3
9
8
:1
9
8
:3
9
9
:1
9
9
:3
Quarters
A
tl
a
n
ta
, 
Fo
rt
 L
a
u
d
e
rd
a
le
, 
K
a
n
sa
s 
C
it
y
-8000
-3000
2000
7000
12000
B
a
lt
im
o
re
, 
H
o
u
st
o
n
, 
C
h
ic
a
g
o
Atlanta Fort Lauderdale Kansas City Baltimore Houston Chicago
FIGURE 4.  NUMBER LEAVING WELFARE
0.03
0.08
0.13
0.18
0.23
0.28
0.33
0.38
0.43
0.48
9
0
:1
9
0
:3
9
1
:1
9
1
:3
9
2
:1
9
2
:3
9
3
:1
9
3
:3
9
4
:1
9
4
:3
9
5
:1
9
5
:3
9
6
:1
9
6
:3
9
7
:1
9
7
:3
9
8
:1
9
8
:3
9
9
:1
9
9
:3
Quarters
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
Atlanta Fort Lauderdale Kansas City Baltimore Houston Chicago
FIGURE 5.  OVERALL WELFARE EXIT RATES
              Urban Welfare-to-Work Transitions in the 
                                                                      1990s:  Patterns in Six Urban Areas
11Illinois and Florida have the most generous income disregard policies, which would tend to
reduce exits.  In Florida, however, stringent time limits undoubtedly overwhelm this effect.  
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mid-1990s (Chicago data are not available before 1995).  By the late 1990s, rates in
Atlanta and Baltimore were more than 15 percent, while the rate in Chicago was only
slightly lower.  In contrast, average exit rates in Kansas City in the early to mid-1990s
were generally over 10 percent, with the rate exceeding15 percent in the most recent
quarter.  Houston had an average exit rate in the 10-15 percent range in the early to mid-
1990s, with exit rates over 20 percent in the most recent two years.  Exit rates in Fort
Lauderdale were only slightly higher than most of the other sites in the early 1990s,
around 10 percent, but they increased dramatically after 1996, growing to 40 percent in
the most recent two years. 
Some of these patterns are clearly tied to legislative, policy, and administrative
decisions.  In Atlanta during the third quarter of 1997, the exit rate increased to 18
percent, from 8 percent in the previous quarter, and then declined to 11 percent in the
following quarter.  This reflects the fact that all welfare recipients who had not signed
personal responsibility agreements were dropped from the rolls in that quarter.  Also, the
dramatic increase in exit rates in Fort Lauderdale is probably the result of Florida's
welfare reform legislation (WAGES), which became ffective statewide with the
implementation f TANF in October 1996, specifying a maximum limit of two years of
welfare receipt in any five-year period.
To what degree have entry and exit patterns contributed to observed declines in
caseloads?  It is clear that in Fort Lauderdale and Houston, which have the largest
caseload eclines, exit rates increased more than most other areas.  But welfare entries
at both these sites also declined ramatically, even before the advent of major diversion
initiatives.  There seems little doubt that both current and prospective recipients have
found alternatives to welfare in these areas.  For Chicago, the decline in the number of
entries--of more than 50 percent in the period over which we have data--appears more
important than an increase in the exit rate, which despite an increase, remains the lowest
of the six sites.11  In contrast, in Atlanta, Baltimore and Kansas City, growth in exit rates
was probably more important.  Notwithstanding important variation across sites, it is
clear that, at all sites, changes in both entries and exit rates contributed to the decline in
the caseload.
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12For four of the sites,  our time series on long-term  welfare recipients begins two years later than
our other welfare statistics, ince the first two years of information must be used to identify length of
receipt.  In these sites, long-term recipients are those who have received welfare in the specified
county continuously for at least two years.  The exceptions are Chicago and Kansas City, which
provided retrospective information on welfare receipt.  Here, an individual is a long-term recipient if
she had received welfare in the state continuously for at least two years.
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D.  Welfare Exit Rates for Long-Term Recipients
Much of the growing concern in the last decade has focused on welfare dependency,
i.e., long-term welfare receipt without real work.  Programs designed to encourage
employment among welfare recipients have frequently specified that long-term
recipients be among the first served, and the 1996 federal welfare reform provided
explicit time limits for welfare receipt.  Figure 6 provides exit rate trends for those
individuals on welfare continuously for at least two years.12  It is clear that exit rates
have increased substantially, although the rates are lower than for all welfare recipients.
Patterns for Atlanta nd Baltimore were very similar, with exit rates for those on welfare
for at least wo years in the early to mid-1990s approximately 5 percent, but increasing
to around 10 percent by 1997.  In the next two years, the rates in Atlanta averaged over
14 percent, while those in Baltimore averaged over 15 percent.  Kansas City’s exit rates
for long-term recipients were very similar, although the upward time trend was less
pronounced, while exit rates for Chicago followed the same pattern but were generally
lower than for any of the other sites.  Houston’s exit rates were generally higher and also
exhibited a substantial increase, from around 10 percent in 1995 to 14 percent in the last
two years.  Finally, although the exit rates for Fort Lauderdale were substantially higher
than those for the other sites in the earlier period, the increase over time is even more
dramatic.  In the last two years, exit rates for long-term recipients averaged more than
30 percent, twice that of any other site.
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13Moffitt  and  Stevens (2000)  provide one of the few careful  discussions of the likely  impacts of
welfare reform on the composition of welfare recipients, concluding that some provisions of the reform
would increase the proportion of disadvantaged recipients, whereas others would reduce it.  Their
analysis of Maryland ata suggests hat welfare reform has not induced major changes in recipient
composition.
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It is clear that exit rates for long-term recipients have accelerated, suggesting that
the special attention focused on this group has borne some fruit.  However, it is
important to bear in mind that, while increasing, the exit rates for long-term recipients
are still lower than for all recipients.  Long-term recipients, of course, tend to have less
work experience and, in general, greater barriers to employment.  There is substantial
fear that welfare reform will falter in the face of an increasing number of long-term
recipients who cannot be weaned from welfare.  Our findings do not support these fears.
Figure 7 graphs the proportion of recipients at each of the sites who have received
welfare for more than two years.  For every site except Chicago, the most recent period
has seen a dramatic decline in the number of long-term recipients.  In Chicago, the
proportion is flat over this period.13
There are, it should be noted, substantial differences in that proportion across ites,
with Chicago the greatest at 70 percent.  Fort Lauderdale has the lowest level and
exhibits the greatest decline, beginning with 41 percent long-term recipients at the end
of 1994, declining to 15 percent by the end of the period, a pattern undoubtedly
reflecting the impact of strict time limits.
E.  Recidivism
Given that people are leaving welfare at increasing rates, one possibility is that many
may be returning to the rolls within relatively short periods.  In the presence of a
booming economy one would expect that people ntering welfare would be those who
have the most difficulty finding jobs, those likely to have been on welfare sometime in
the recent past.  As a result, the number of reentrants as a percentage of all individuals
entering welfare should rise.  On the other hand, once time limits on lifetime receipt of
welfare take effect, prior recipients might be less likely to enter welfare, either because
they have exceded their allowable time or because they wish to “bank” remaining
eligibility.
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Figure 8 shows the proportion of entries onto w lfare who had received welfare at
some point in the prior two years for each site.  Through the 1990s, the trend is clearly
positive at all sites, but in the most recent wo years trends differ across sites.  In
Chicago, 
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14Of those who receive  welfare in quarter T but not T+1, this is the proportion who are employed
in quarter T+1.
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increases in the proportion of repeat recipients continue in last two years.  Although the
trend in Baltimore is more variable and thatin Kansas City less strong, these continue
to be increasing in the last two years.  Patterns over the last two years for Atlanta and
Fort Lauderdale are irregular, while Houston reverses the earlier pattern, showing a
moderate decline.
F.  Welfare-to-Work Transition Profiles
The focus on work as an alternative to welfare is a striking element of the reforms
of the past decade.  Do recent caseload declines reflect increasingly attractive
employment opportunities made available or accessed by new programs that provide job
skills to welfare recipients in a strong economy?  The alternative possibility is that
reforms have operated primarily by pushing individuals from the rolls with little regard
for their employment prospects.  Of course, these explanations are not fully distinct
conceptually, and distinguishing between them is not easy in practice.  Since sanctions
are a part of many programs designed to encourage and support employment, even
successful job programs may rely on coercion to some degree.  Equally important, even
if individuals are forced from the welfare rolls with little support and poor prospects, a
portion would doubtless obtain employment anyway.
Employment levels and changes in those levels for individuals eaving welfare give
an important indication of the role played by employment in recent caseload declines.
Figure 9 presents rends in the number of recipients who discontinue a welfare spell and
are employed or become mployed, as a proportion of those xiting the welfare rolls.14
This proportion is initially highest in Atlanta nd Kansas City, with Baltimore, Chicago
and Houston somewhat lower, and Fort Lauderdale appreciably lower until the last two
years.  In each of these sites, the proportion has increased over all but the last two years.
We observe a substantial decline in the employment level in Atlanta early in 1997, while
in the other sites we see that there is little or no change.
FIGURE 9. EMPLOYMENT RATES FOR WELFARE LEAVERS
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15It should be noted  that the most  important  changes  in the formal policy  governing Houston’s
welfare system did not take effect until late 1997.  But the “mood” was certainly changing in prior
years, as signaled by these administrative milestones.
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These trends are consistent with the view that hrough most of the 1990s, individuals
have been attracted or deflected from welfare by employment opportunities.
Alternatively, if individuals were forced to leave welfare, efforts to obtain jobs for them
have been at least somewhat successful.  
One may wonder whether differences in levels of employment across ites identify
differences in economic growth.  Returning to Figure 1, we see that unemployment rates
in Fort Lauderdale  are not  appreciably  higher  than  those  in  four  of  the  other sites.
Furthermore, during the last two years, when Fort Lauderdale welfare leavers’
employment rates increase to the levels in other sites, overall unemployment i  Fort
Lauderdale is among the highest.  It seems unlikely that differences in labor market are
the primary reason for variation across sites in employment rates of those leaving
welfare.
Returning to the patterns in the caseload, it would appear that he dramatic declines
in the Fort Lauderdale and Houston welfare rolls reflect increasingly stringent s andards
rather than improved job opportunities.  The welfare reform in Florida is of clear
importance, and major changes in the administration f the program in Texas may have
been critical in forcing recipients from welfare.  The patterns we observed for Houston
do not suggest that these administrative changes reduced the welfare caseload by
accessing better job opportunities for welfare recipients.  On the other hand, the fact that
employment rates for welfare leavers did not decline at a time of dramatic caseload
declines may well be viewed in positive terms.15  Atlanta appears to be the only site
where welfare policy changes have clearly led to the departure of recipients who had
serious difficulty obtaining jobs.  The appreciable decline in welfare leavers’
employment rates corresponds to implementation of TANF and state welfare reform.
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16In Figure 10,  the population at risk is all those  meeting our  criteria who are welfare recipients
at time T and are employed at T+1.  The proportion of these who are not receiving welfare payments
in time T+1 is the welfare exit rate for this group.
17These  individuals  are  defined as those  receiving  welfare  in  quarter  T but  not  in T+1,  and
employed in quarter T+1 but not T and so excludes any individual whose employment and welfare
receipt overlap.  The only case where a person would be in this group but would not experience a
support gap would be if the last welfare check was received in the third month of one quarter and
employment began immediately at the start of the next quarter.
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Another comparison may be useful in gauging the extent to which departures are a
function of labor market opportunities.  Figure 10 reports the proportion of individuals
who  leave  welfare  among  those  who are employed.16   Ther   appears to  have  been
substantial increase in this figure at all the sites.  Levels and increases are somewhat
higher in Houston and much greater in Fort Lauderdale.  Nearly 35 percent of employed
individuals in Houston exit welfare in a given quarter, and the number is over 50 percent
for Fort Lauderdale.  This contrasts with employed exit rates at the other sites that are
generally in the range 17-30 percent.  Of course, these exits from welfare reflect in part
the fact that anyone who obtains a job that pays well enough will become ineligible for
welfare.  For Houston, the initial eligibility threshold is low compared to the other sites
(see Table 3), so only low levels of earnings are consistent with welfare receipt, and the
maximum benefits are also low, so retaining eligibility is of relatively little value.  Such
factors do not explain the very high departure rates in Fort Lauderdale, since, if
anything, the rules would imply that welfare is compatible with higher earnings than in
Houston.
One additional measure attempts to gauge the extent o which individuals who
obtain jobs are nonetheless individuals who are forced off of welfare.  Among those who
left welfare and were employed, a portion received no earnings in the last quarter in
which they received welfare payments.  This group is of interest because it identifies
individuals who almost certainly experienced a “support gap” between the time they
discontinued welfare and the time since they began employment.17  If such individuals
are a growing share of those exiting welfare who have jobs, this suggests that shifts in
the stringency of welfare standards are forcing people off welfare and into employment.
In contrast, if this proportion is not growing, it suggests that most of those who are
employed may have found employment opportunities more attractive than cash
assistance.
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Figure 11 shows the proportion, among those leaving welfare and who have jobs in
the following period, who very likely experienced a support gap.  Although the measure
is not altogether stable, it is clear that his proportion is much higher for Fort Lauderdale
than for the other sites.  It also increases dramatically in Atlanta in the final two years
of our period, exceeding that in Fort Lauderdale.  This supports the view that
employment rates for welfare leavers in those sites reflect, at least in p r , an increase
in the number of individuals who are pushed off of welfare, yet who ultimately find jobs.
For the other sites, the proportions show very little trend.  This supports the view that
even as exits from welfare accelerate, these sites have continued to facilitate relatively
successful welfare-to-work transitions for those leaving welfare.
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Conclusion and Implications
The relationships identified here provide a window into the dynamics underlying the
dramatic decline in welfare caseloads over the past decade.  The public policy emphasis
on moving welfare recipients into jobs is reflected in observed figures, with an
increasing number of those who leave welfare reporting earnings in the following
quarter.  On the other hand, it is clear that employment is not the only path off of
welfare, and it still remains the case that  large portion of those who leave welfare do
not appear to obtain jobs.  Although our earnings data miss certain kinds of employment,
including employment outside the state, such employment clearly accounts for only a
small share of those leaving welfare.
The impact of state policies is clearly reflected in the patterns of welfare receipt and
employment that we observe.  There is little doubt that Florida’s time limits were
important in inducing the dramatic movements off of the rolls, which long-term
residents leaving at remarkably high rates.  Atlanta’s implementation of TANF appears
to have signaled a major shift in state policy, and although caseload eclines are not as
great here, the statistics how the impact on employment of a much harsher set of
policies.  The results in both these sites suggest that the goal of assuring that former
recipients obtain employment has suffered as policies that reduce the caseload are
implemented.
Nonetheless, looking across all sites, although TANF implementation nduced more
dramatic declines in the caseload than prior policy changes, the employment position of
leavers does not appear to have suffered much. The reforms were undoubted helped by
the continued strong economy, but it is clear that policy changes played the primary role.
Viewed in terms of their impact on both caseloads and the employment of former
recipients, they can be judged a success.
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in the state.  FRP Report/Brief 47(July 2000)
A Decade of Budget Growth: Where Has the Money Gone? (Alan Essig)
This report presents an analysis of state budget growth between fiscal years 1991
and 2000.  In specific, policy decisions that drive the budget increases are
highlighted.  FRP Report/Brief 46(September 2000)
International Trade in Georgia: Review of State Programs, Policies, and Recent
Trends. (Robert E. Moore)
This report provides a review of the recent trends on international trade in Georgia
and reviews Georgia’s policy and programs related to international trade.  FRP
Report/Brief 45 (July 2000)
(All publications listed are available at http://frp.aysps.gsu.ed  or call the Fiscal Research Program at
404/651-2782, or fax us at 404/651-2737. )
